

GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

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Introduction

Development economics, considered as a branch of economics that attempts to show how the world's poor economies can develop, had its origins in the 1940s and 1950s. One of its earliest ideas was that the economies of the less developed countries were mired in a cycle of poverty and needed a “*Big Push*” to develop. This push was seen as a boost in investment, helped by state's infrastructural and social spending, as well as by private foreign capital spending and public aid from the governments of the developed nations. Much of development economics was in narrative form; it was one of the least formal and mathematically modelled branches of economics. For this reason, and others as we shall see, it fell out of favour less than a generation after it began. Mainstream economics thought of itself as a rigorous “science”, and for its economists what was not rigorously mathematical was simply not economics. However, in the late 1980s, development economics began to rise again, thanks to its reformulation in more “scientific” terms. According to some economists, the demise of development economics was a pity –if only its originators had been more “rigorous”. Noted neo-classical economist, Krugman put it this way: “*When I look at the Murphy et al. [whose article helped resurrect development economics] representation of the Big Push idea, I find myself wondering whether the long slump in development theory was really necessary. The model is so simple: three pages, two equations, and one diagram*”¹. This is how Krugman summarizes the “*fall and rise of development economics*”, or half-century of history of development thought, between the *Big Push* formulation by Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943 and its formalization by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny in 1989. Because of its lack of rigor, the “*glory days of high development theory*” lasted only fifteen years, ending with the 1958 publication of Hirschman's book on economic development. According to Krugman, until its reformulation, development theory was no more than an approximate literature, with “*some wonderful writing, inspiring insights*”, but which could not mathematically model its basic assumptions. It became an “*intellectual dead end*”. It is only in the 1980s, when Krugman and others managed to integrate non-convexities concepts, like increasing returns or externalities, into the neoclassical paradigm, that development theory experienced a rebirth and achieved scientific status². This thesis of disappearance-reappearance of development theory is now shared by a majority of specialists, not just by neo-classicals, for whom there is no science out of the mainstream, and therefore no discussion of development without reference to their standard models, but also by heterodox economists. However, the present article intends to show how neoclassical economics, which has absorbed development as one of its components, is prisoner of a deep crisis, and how the mainstream domination in the theoretical field is inseparable from that of neo-liberal development policies.

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¹ Krugman (1993).

² Krugman (1990).

Neo-liberalism against development

Development theory was born in the 40s from a double differentiation: first, with respect to standard neo-classical economics, by the rejection of the dogmas of systematic trade benefits and the virtues of the market; second, with respect to Keynesian economics (mainstream from 1945 to 1975), by the inadequacy of its analysis of unemployment and short-term growth in examining the structural problems encountered by developing countries. There was a heterodox element in it from the beginning. Because of this, the new field encouraged those who were more radically heterodox to analyze development, such as Marxists and structuralists, and these in turn begat the economics of planning, dependency theory, theories of the capitalist world system, structural-Cepalism... These evolutions in history of thought were connected to those occurring in the history of facts: the revolutions of the twentieth century (Russia, China...), the national liberation movements (India...), and the needs for rebuilding in the post-war period (Marshall Plan in the West). Development economics appeared in the intellectual space opened by the social transformations occurring under the pressure of the peoples' struggles worldwide, as more or less radical attempts to break away from the laws of the world system. So, the state was placed at the heart of all strategies for structural change, endeavouring as far as possible to "self-center" or make more autonomous the conditions of accumulation: industrialization and planning in the East and in socialist countries of the South, capitalist developmentalism of the national bourgeoisies elsewhere. One understood it all the better because the only take-off of a non-European country within the capitalist system, Japan, offered a model of industrialization thoroughly led by the state (Meiji era). It is this space, product of history of facts and ideas, that was going to be reconquered in the 1970-1980s, by neo-liberalism in practice, and by the new neo-classical mainstream in economic theory.

Neo-liberalism means the return to power of high finance, *i.e.* the most powerful (mainly U.S.) world capital owners. It started at the end of the 1970s –precisely since the 1979 rise in interest rates in the United States, exacerbating the Third-World debt crisis. This return took place on the ruins of the world system pillars built after World War II. The decline in profit rates recorded in the center countries at the end of the 1960s deepened and, in the 1970s, spread into an open crisis, characterized by a swing of the whole system into monetary-financial chaos, exploding inequalities, and mass unemployment. The conjunction of the questioning of Keynesian regulation of capitalism in the North (brought on by stagflation in the 1970s), the failures of the national developmentalist projects in the South (debt crisis in the 1980s), and the collapse of the Soviet block in the East (beginning of the 1990s), caused deep changes in capital-labour relations on a worldwide scale. As the ways followed by its pioneers were not those of the mainstream, and as the social forces carrying it were losing ground, post-war development theory could only be considered by the neo-classical orthodoxy as a backwater of unscientific decline. The failures of development policies, especially import substitution industries, became obvious in the 1980s, the period of the advent of neo-liberalism. It is in this context of retreat of workers and people from the periphery that the global offensive of the neo-liberal ideology in managing the capital expansion crisis must be understood. Its dogmas are known. At the national level, it is a question: *i*) of carrying out an aggressive anti-state strategy, by deforming the structure of capital ownership to the benefit of the private sector and by reducing public spending for social purposes; and *ii*) of imposing a wage austerity as a key priority in fighting against inflation. At the global level, the objectives are: *i*) to perpetuate the supremacy of the U.S. dollar over the international monetary system; and *ii*) to promote free trade, by dismantling protectionism and liberalizing capital transfers. The standardization of this planetary deregulating strategy is part of the functions of the major international organizations (first and foremost among them the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO) and of local monetary-financial institutions (the so-called "independent" central banks) –the edifice being placed under the control of the United States, whose military supremacy guarantees the functioning of the whole system.

Good governance or good government?

Any idea of development out of the neo-liberal capitalism is as a consequence prohibited, as well as any independence of development theory as a discipline distinct from the dominating neo-classical corpus. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the international organizations have been lavishing upon their member countries recommendations for “*good governance*”. But the definitions of this term and, along with them, its substance, have varied noticeably from one institution to another, preventing the formulation of a precise legal scheme –particularly since governance can also be global, corporate... Within the framework of its loans and oversight operations, the IMF seeks to promote good governance covering “*all aspects of the conduct of public affairs*”. Applicable in countries benefiting from its technical aid, and closely associated with its anti-corruption fight, the IMF code of good governance aims to make economic policy decisions more transparent, to make available the maximum of information regarding public finances, to standardize audit procedures and, recently, to “*combat the financing of terrorism*”³. According to the World Bank, the governance of the “*client countries*” should “*go beyond the dysfunctioning of the public sector (the ‘symptom’) to help these countries adopt the reforms*” designed to improve public resource allocation mechanisms, “*the processes of formulation, choice and implementation of policies, or the relations between citizens and their government*”. If the UNDP links governance to sustainable human development, the Asian Development Bank emphasizes private sector participation, whereas the Inter-American Development Bank stresses the strengthening of civil society, the OECD accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, economic forecasting and the primacy of law, the EBRD human rights and democratic principles. In spite of the vagueness of the concept and of the normative judgement criteria involved, the goals formulated by these organizations are quite clear and convergent: what is at stake is the shaping of states’ policies to create those institutional environments most favourable to the opening up of the countries of the South to globalized financial markets.

The official line in this matter is that of the IMF. For its purposes, good governance consists essentially of “*deregulating the exchange, trade and price systems*”, “*limiting ad hoc decision making and preferential treatment of individuals and organizations*” and “*eliminating direct credit allocation*” by the state. It is clear that reaching these goals is indissociable from pursuing neo-liberal economic policies and the social model that is the ultimate purpose of their implementation. Imposed since the beginning of the 1980s upon most countries of the South, this strategy –structural adjustment plans, deregulation, privatizations, free movement of capital...– has brought in its wake, in every domain and on every continent, the proof of its failure. As a reflection of the hegemonic power of high finance –to wit of the major owners of capital, especially U.S. capital–, neo-liberalism is not a development model, but a domination one. Its social disasters and human dramas are too well known to need to be explained. Its new ideological anti-state dogma, *good governance*, can thus only be seen as an inversion of *good government*. The aim is not the development of democratic participation of the individuals in decision-making processes, nor the respect of their right to development, but state-sponsored market deregulation, *i.e.* re-regulation by the forces of capital on a world-wide scale.

Confronted with economic neo-liberalism’s impossibility of managing the crisis of the capitalist world system and with the refusal of the international organizations to acknowledge the urgency of finding an alternative that might impose upon capital’s dynamic of expansion limits independent of its drive for maximization of profit, good governance can only intensify its criticism of “*the state failures*”. Civil servants are not only accused of rent seeking; what is henceforth called into question, especially in the indebted countries of the South, is their own capacity to manage public affairs and to build and sustain “decent” institutions. Nevertheless, the coincidence of moralizing rhetoric about the *responsibility* of states (to which, alone, all

³ International Monetary Fund (2003), *Good Governance The IMF Role*, Washington, D.C., 2003.

errors are imputed) and discourses about the *irresponsibility* of their agents (when it is not their decency that is being questioned) is nothing other than a legitimizing of the ultra-liberal option of abandoning the *regalian* prerogatives of state, which in some cases goes so far as to delegate national defense, substitute a foreign currency for the national one, or privatize tax collection. Whence this striking paradox, inherent in governance, of calls going out from the international organizations to national governments that these latter adopt “appropriate”, indeed neo-liberal, economic policies imposed from without while globalized financial markets dispossess these states of their real sovereignty and insinuate themselves into the countries’ ownership structure of capital. Managing the *state apparatus* of the South directly from the center of the capitalist world system, while neutralizing their *state power* by stripping them of all prerogatives and reducing to a minimum their margins of maneuver, would this not be, in the final reckoning, the secret of *ideal governance*? What democracy could public authorities pretend to when they limit the exercise of national sovereignty to the opening up of and liberalization of markets, to the repayment of the foreign debt, and to the payment of dividends on foreign investment?⁴

IMF: a model of bad governance?

The IMF’s insistence on good governance, which has become one of the conditions of aid to the peripheral economies in the South as well as of relief from their foreign debt, reveals the progressively greater politicization of its interventions, and the drift of its missions into areas beyond those encompassed in its mandate. Its oversight of macro-economic policies and of the private-sector-activities environment, confidence in which is supposed to constitute the *sine qua non* of sustained growth, applies henceforth to “*all aspects*” of state institutions, including the nature of the political regime, which is required to be as “*transparent*” as possible. The question that one must then ask is whether this body enforces with equal single-mindedness, regarding its own *modus operandi*, the standards it imposes upon the countries of the South. If the IMF is to be believed, the answer would be affirmative: guidelines are in place to assure ethical behaviour and prevent the corruption of its personnel; a professional ethics counsellor is on the scene, and so on. Nonetheless, numerous facts converge to suggest that the IMF is today a model of *bad governance*.

Democratic and impartial institutions (*i*), the diffusion of information to the public (*ii*), transparency in decision-making procedures (*iii*), the participation of all actors (*iv*), free and fair elections (*v*), efficient management of public resources (*vi*), expert competence in assessing situations (*vii*), accountability (*viii*), integrity (*ix*), respect for human rights (*x*), should be some of the hallmarks of good governance. How does the IMF measure up to this?

- i. In this institution, where the weight of a member is a function of its monetary contribution to the budget, the United States alone disposes of the right of veto over all major decisions⁵.
- ii. In spite of recent progress, still limited in scope, the availability of documents drafted by the IMF is subjected to considerable restrictions.
- iii. The negotiations that it is involved with remain obscure and, for the most part, shrouded in total secrecy.

⁴ In such circumstances, we can only be disquieted by the “*public-private partnerships (PPP) for development*” initiatives launched by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and in particular by the setting up of the Global Compact (*cf.* speech by Kofi Annan at Davos in 1999). This moral pact concluded between the United Nations and big business intends, officially, “*to give to the globalized market a human face*” by taking care that a core of “*shared values and principles*” relative to human rights, labour legislation, and the protection of the environment be observed by transnational corporations. In reality, this all too risky deal allows these firms to make United Nations institutions dependent on corporate financing and to use the public and universal UN “label” for their own private purposes. See: *Building on Quicksand*, CETIM, Declaration of Berne and IBFAN-GIFA, Geneva, October 2003.

⁵ And the dependence of the IMF on the U.S. Department of the Treasury is no longer a secret...

- iv. The scope of its interlocutors is extremely limited (mainly finance ministers and central bank authorities), although it has been slightly broadened in recent years (to industry heads, for example), but no attempt is ever made to involve or to consult through any democratic process the people affected by its policies.
- v. As consensus is the usual method of decision-making, only exceptionally are programs submitted to a vote.
- vi. The structural adjustment plans have turned out to be totally ineffective in resolving domestic as well as foreign imbalances, and have even contributed to causing and propagating financial crises.
- vii. Its experts are subjected to no evaluation procedure regarding the general pertinence of their recommendations, much less regarding the appropriateness of such recommendations to the needs and expectations of the people they affect.
- viii. The very quality of the work done by the IMF's experts, compared with what is available in academic economic literature, is questionable.
- ix. The anti-corruption rhetoric does not prevent the financing –and with full knowledge of the results– of political regimes that are notoriously corrupt.
- x. Many of the countries that receive its financial aid have been criticized for their systematic violation of human rights.

Our purpose here is not only to aim our criticism at the dominant body of the international monetary-financial institutions –whose reform is demanded from all quarters and amounts to basic common sense. It is also and especially to stress that the failures of the IMF in its support of the interests of creditors, banks and transnationals bespeaks the failure of global governance imposed by the G7, under the leadership of the United States, as a way of getting the world system out of its crisis. The hallmarks of good governance will be sought for in vain as long as the structural obstacles that prevent the majority of the countries of the South from exercising their right to development have not been removed. Today more than ever, it is obvious that economic neo-liberalism must be abandoned, the debt problem must be solved, the dominant role of financial speculation must be ended and the activities of the transnational corporations, which are so much the cause of the current system of unequal exchanges, must be checked.

What, then, are the indispensable transformations that must be carried out to construct a democratic world, assuring the peoples of the world better living and working conditions, and an effective participation in the making and implementation of the decisions that affect their lives and their collective future? Any discussion of this challenge must take into account the following points:

1. the modification of the rules of market access and of financial and monetary systems, which implies a rethinking and remaking of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO;
2. the creation of a system of taxation and income redistribution on a world-wide scale, both more ambitious and more coherent than a “*Tobin tax*”;
3. an end of the regulation of the world system *by violence*, with the demilitarization of the planet and peace keeping;
4. the reinforcement and democratization of the United Nations organizations, conciliating the rights of the individuals and of the peoples, political and social rights, universalism and cultural diversity;
5. the collective management of natural resources, to be used in the service of all peoples, and in the strict respect for the environment.

Such are some of the *sine qua non* requisites for dynamic civil societies, for sovereign and *authentically democratic* states, for autonomous regionalizations reinforcing the positions of disadvantaged countries within the world system, but also for the realization of the purpose of human rights, in their individual as well as in their collective dimensions: food, health, lodging, education, security rule of law, justice, equality...

The absorption of development by neo-classic economics "The absorption of development by neo-classic economics" | 5

For more than twenty years, almost without sharing, the neo-classicals have dominated economic theory, including the theory of economic development. Their ambition is to analyze all socio-economic facts by starting from the maximizing behaviours of individuals. The heart of neo-classical economics –as well as the source of its claim to being a science– is the general equilibrium theory. Heavily mathematical, strongly normative, it is the keystone of all standard micro-economics. Its very purpose is to determine the way by which the choices of the many agents can be coordinated within a framework integrating the whole of the interdependences linked to their exchanges. Supposed to be free, rational, and driven by personal interest, these choices depend not only on the agents' characteristics (*i.e.* factor endowments, preferences and tastes, conjectures, production functions...), but also on the forms of the social organization in which their relations operate, or "*market structures*". The privileged case is a market structure of perfect competition which allows the model, under assumptions known as Arrow-Debreu hypothesis⁶, to give an equilibrium solution for which the coordination of individual choices is possible, and resource allocation optimal in the sense given by Pareto. While this model aims at processing information concerning a great number of individuals, the technical difficulties encountered by the neo-classicals often lead them to develop representations with a restricted number of agents, on the assumption that these are "representative" of all agents. In extreme cases, but far from being rare since they allow mathematical simplifications, the agent is single. It is assumed that the entire analysis can be successfully worked out in the case of a single individual, like Robinson Crusoe on his island. Insofar as general equilibrium provides an ultimate theoretical reference for almost all neo-classical models, knowledge of it is crucial. From the end of the 1970s, this theory has been amply applied in the field of development, thanks to the use of computable general equilibrium models. The latter calculate, on the basis of individual behaviours, the values of equilibrium variables in the economy, for example price or quantity effects of variations of parameters linked to economic policy, such as subsidies or taxes. The World Bank made a systematic use of these tools to try to justify theoretically and to make credible politically the anti-social measures of structural adjustment imposed to the South, thus contributing to their broad diffusion within the academic spheres.

Furthermore, the study of the role of institutions in growth also led the neo-classicals to consider issues of development. For a long time, according to the standard perfect competition theory, institutions were regarded as exogenous, that is to say as given. Thus, their analysis was excluded from economic reasoning and left to other disciplines in social sciences dealing with collective categories, such as sociology or political science. However, more recently, the neo-classical authors have been placing institutions right inside the general equilibrium models and applying standard economic analysis to their behaviour. But, to do this, orthodox economists simply assume that individual maximizing behaviour can fully explain what institutions are and what they do. For instance, the analysis of Indian castes by Akerlof in game theory begins by assuming that there is a standard model of economic behaviour, applicable in all times and places, namely that implicit in Arrow-Debreu perfect competition general equilibrium models⁷. North even assume, to facilitate the argument, that "*in the beginning*", there were markets...⁸ In macroeconomics, development economics has been much influenced by the "new neo-classical growth theory", called "endogenous growth"⁹. Introduced by Romer and Lucas, these models, seek to explain *per capita* GDP growth by the accumulation process itself, that is

⁶ Kirman (1988).

⁷ Akerlof (1976).

⁸ See: North (1989, 1990). Also North and Thomas (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972).

⁹ See: Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Also: Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Herrera (2006).

endogeneously, *i.e.* by the production factors (capital or/and labour), without resorting to exogenous engines, as in the Solow (1956) model. One of the predictions of endogenous growth is the absence of path convergence between countries, with the key conclusion that, in market economies, the state must intervene to accelerate capital accumulation, thus growth in the long term. Thanks to these models, the neo-classicals are now in a dominant position in long-run growth modelling. Many heterodox economists, exasperated by the neo-liberal anti-state thesis, responded to this new neo-classical theory's charms.

Crisis of neo-classic economics and crisis of neo-liberalism

Thus, neo-classical economics has heterodox economists on the defensive, attacking them on the fronts of micro- and macro-economics, as well as that of the institutions. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the mainstream onslaught is not due to a theoretical superiority. As a matter of fact, neo-classical economics is in a deep theoretical crisis. In micro-economics, it is mathematically impossible for the orthodox authors to prove the unicity of the general equilibrium from the agents' maximizing behaviours¹⁰. For sure, such theoretical problems are never mentioned in the neo-classical studies devoted to development, especially in computable general equilibrium models; but they constitute the most serious challenge for the mainstream. Neo-classical economics has no answer to them. In macro-economics, the often used postulate of the representative agent¹¹ implies to wonder whether speaking about a "market" or an "exchange price" makes sense, if there is a single agent. Furthermore, the new neo-classical growth theory is unable to explain basic concepts as "capital" –which is the engine of growth: knowledge, human capital, infrastructure...?–, or even the state –how to distinguish it from the single agent? In the neo-institutional fields, the ideology of free individual choices leads to intellectual catastrophes, such as the explanation of feudalism by North¹² or that of current resurgence of share-cropping in the South by Stiglitz¹³. Did not Williamson teach to us that all "private contract" resulting from inter-individual transactions were rational and efficient at each period of history¹⁴? Is it surprising to see him recently asserting the paternity and validity of the "institutional reforms" of the Washington Consensus? What the neo-classicals present as progresses in the theory are actually intellectual regressions, changing economic science into economic science-fiction.

Neo-liberal policies have been used for three decades now to manage the capitalist crisis. They have offered much by way of speculative investment opportunities to the capital owners, that is to say high finance, especially from the U.S. These policies have been harmful to most of humanity, especially in the South: odious debt repayments, capital flight, remittances of profits on foreign investments. Neo-liberalism is not a development model; it is the strategy put into practice by high finance, whose effects have been to develop under-development in the South while achieving slow capital accumulation in the North. In spite of its failures in all fields, and by implication, the failure of its legions of experts¹⁵, it continues to be imposed unilaterally. Meanwhile, intra- and international inequalities are exploding. As a consequence, the pursuit of neo-liberalism –one of whose ideological underpinnings is that these will reduce poverty–, has become more and more a "war against the poor". Most economists –including those portrayed

¹⁰ Sonnenschein (1973).

¹¹ For example in the real business cycle theory: Kydland and Prescott 1982 (2004 Nobel Awards).

¹² The lord offers collective goods for which no market exists; in counterpart the remuneration of his services takes adequate institutional forms (serfdom) to prevent free riding (North, 1990).

¹³ Supposed to be rational, share-cropping contracts ensure to landowners balancing between risks of fluctuations of receipts from land and labour incentives of sharecroppers (Stiglitz, 1974).

¹⁴ Williamson (1975).

¹⁵ See, for example: Sachs (2005a, 2005b).

as sensitive to the social aspects of development— do not propose concrete alternatives to neo-liberalism’s wide development.

The debates between “great” economists (Nobel Prize winners) are sharp, especially on issues raised by the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. Schelling, Nobel laureate for his discoveries in game theory¹⁶ was part of the expert group of the 2003 “Copenhagen Consensus” formed to evaluate the Millennium Goals. He recommended that the U.N. give a lower priority in the Goals to the reduction of greenhouse gases¹⁷, that greater protection be given to corporate patents of AIDS medicines, and that genetically modified organisms be promoted to fight against malnutrition. Schelling was hardly exceptional in his views. But this is hardly the case. Remember Fogel’s (1993 Nobel Award) interpretation of slavery as basically a free choice type of relationship between masters and slaves. And how can we forget Friedman (1976 Nobel Prize), who believes that state intervention beyond educational services spontaneously offered by the market “*is not necessary*” and leads to a system worse than that which would have developed if the market had played an increasing role. Or Hayek (1974 Nobel Prize), whose ultraliberal positions are too well-known to need explication here? And according to Becker (1992 Nobel Prize), the “Chicago Boys” willingness to work for General Pinochet was “*one of the best things that happened to Chile*”¹⁸. As one of their inspirers at the University of Chicago, he declared that he was “*proud of their richly deserved glory*”. In the same spirit, Barro, only Nobel hopeful, wrote recently in one of his last books, entitled *Nothing Is Sacred*, that the current “*good*” economic performance of Chile is undoubtedly due to the neo-liberal reforms implemented by Pinochet during the period 1973-1989, since nobody did more than him to prove the “*superiority*” of capitalism on socialism¹⁹.

To conclude: more than 50 years after the Bandung conference...

Today, calling for a new Bandung of the peoples of the South and of the North, more than fifty years after the 1955 conference, appears to be a necessity. The solidarity of all the peoples in the construction of a common, universal civilization in its diversity cannot be founded on the illusory notion that it is possible simply to ignore the conflicts of interest that separate different classes and nations that make up the real world. The regionalizations behind the alternative globalization movement must seek to strengthen the autonomy and the solidarity of peoples on the five continents, but this perspective is in contradiction to that of the present dominant model of regionalization, conceived as consisting of mere building blocks of neo-liberal globalization. So, the principles of the building of this new economic international order could be the following: 1) For an economic reorganization of the global system, defining the actions to reinforce the protest campaigns against the current rules of operation of the WTO and to define alternative rules, to organize the control of the transfer of capital and technology as well as the control of the flow of capital (in particular speculative), to suppress tax havens, to build regional systems of management of exchange rates, to call in question the role of the IMF and the World Bank, to return to the rule of national laws to define the local economic system, to overcome the obstacles imposed by the unnegotiated decisions of international organization, to reinforce the mobilizations to provide audits allowing people to get the right to identify and to cancel unilaterally illegitimate debts... But also: 2) For a multipolar world system founded on peace, law, and negotiation, with calls for the prohibition of the use and the manufacture of nuclear weapons and for the destruction of the existing arsenals, as well as calls

¹⁶ And also once employed by the Rand Corporation, in which capacity his work influenced Robert McNamara in decisions made in the long escalation during the war of Vietnam.

¹⁷ Schelling had previously supported the U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocols.

¹⁸ Becker (1997).

¹⁹ Barro (2002).

to dismantle the military bases outside of national territory. 3) For regionalizations in the service of the peoples and reinforcing the South in global negotiations. 4) For the democratic management of the planet's natural resources. 5) For a better future for peasant farmers (for the removal of the WTO from agriculture...). 6) For the building of a labour's front at a worldwide scale. 7) For a democratization of societies as a necessary step to the full human development. 8) For the eradication of all forms of oppression, exploitation, and alienation of women. 9) For the democratic management of the media and cultural diversity, underlying the importance of the rights to education, to obtain information and to inform. 10) For the democratization of international organizations and the institutionalization of a multipolar international order.

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